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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS: A REVISED
APPROACH TO THE MARKETPLACE
OF IDEAS CONCEPT
PATRICK GARRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a long tradition of and a general belief in a free press, the courts
have not developed a comprehensive theory of freedom of the press and its
protection under the first amendment.' Freedom of the press cases have
only recently come before the United States Supreme Court.2 The diverse
doctrinal patterns of the Court's decisions illustrate a lack of consensus
about the meaning, scope and application of the free press clause of the first
amendment.3 Several Supreme Court cases decided in the 1970's demon-
strate the Court's confusion concerning the relation between the freedom of
the press clause and the freedom of speech clause.4 The first area of confu-
sion is whether or not each clause provides a separate and distinct protec-
tion from the other. The Court has never affirmatively given independent
significance to the press clause. It has not given the press any more protec-
tion than an individual enjoys under the speech clause.5 Nor has any
Supreme Court decision rested solely on the press clause independent of the
* Attorney with Briggs & Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN; B.A., St. John's University,
1977; M.A., University of Minnesota, 1979; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1983;
Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1986.
1. One scholar asserts that the outstanding fact about the first amendment today lies in the
lack of Supreme Court guidance in developing one comprehensive theory of the press clause. See
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970).
2. Not until 1965 was an act of Congress held invalid by the Supreme Court on grounds that
it violated the first amendment. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). In Lamont, the
congressional Act was found to be unconstitutional because it violated protected first amendment
interests in the delivery by mail of foreign political propaganda. Id. at 305-07.
3. For critical surveys of the first amendment decisions of the Burger Court, see Cox, Fore-
word: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1980); Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1980).
4. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
5. The press has lost numerous Supreme Court cases in which it claimed some right not
available to individuals under the speech clause. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979)
(exemption from discovery of journalists' thought processes); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 8-12 (access
to jail). The Supreme Court came within one vote of sustaining a prior restraint. Absent the press
clause, with its undisputed historical objective of prohibiting prior restraints, the decision might
have gone the other way.
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speech clause. Although the Court has never explicitly given the press
clause independent significance, neither has it foreclosed the possibility.6 In
some decisions, the Court has apparently recognized that the two clauses
may embody or protect distinct freedoms.7
If one accepts the premise, as the Court has tacitly done, that the press
clause has independent significance from the speech clause, a second area of
confusion arises. This concerns the nature of freedoms protected by the
free press clause. Among those scholars and judges who believe in the inde-
pendence of the two clauses, there are numerous conflicting interpretations
of the free press clause.8 The most visible and influential theory at the pres-
ent time is the "fourth estate" theory first formulated by Justice Stewart.
Under this theory, the free press clause gives "structural" protection to the
institutional press as a "fourth estate" which serves as a check on the abuses
6. According to some scholars, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to interpret the free
press clause of the first amendment as anything other than a guarantee of free speech for the press.
However, some individual members of the Court have been willing to accord the free press clause
independent significance. Justice Douglas has accorded the press clause independent significance:
"The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money,
not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know."
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger has been the only member of the Court who has expressed hostility to-
ward the prospect of specific constitutional protection for the press, and even he conceded that the
question was still open. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-802 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). Burger argued that the press clause should not be read to give the institutional
press any freedoms not enjoyed by all others. First, "the history of the Clause does not suggest
that the authors contemplated a 'special' or 'institutional' privilege." Id. at 798. Second, the task
of defining "the press" would involve some governmental entity in a process "reminiscent of the
abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England - a system the first amendment was
intended to ban from this country." Id. at 801.
7. In Pell, 417 U.S. 817, and Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843, the Court, borrowing from its opinion in
Branzburg, acknowledged that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,
... for without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated." Pell, 417 U.S. at 833 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681). The concession that the freedom
of the press clause protected a right not available under the freedom of speech clause was quickly
withdrawn, however, by the further comment that "[tlhe Constitution does not, however, require
government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public
generally." Id. at 834.
8. Commentators have frequently advocated an institutional interpretation. See Bezanson,
The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977); Blanchard, The Institutional Press and
Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. Cr. REV. 225; Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 521, 523; Nimmer, Introduction, Is Freedom of
the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975);
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). For a contrary analysis that takes the
position that definitional and functional problems prevent separation of speech and press, see
Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Van Alstyne, The Hazards to
the Press of Claiming a Preferred Position, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977).
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of government.9 A "fourth estate" press provides organized, expert scru-
tiny of all three branches of government - in effect, it serves as a fourth
competitive branch among the three official branches. 10
The inquiry into the nature of the free press protections raises the issue
of whether the clause is individualistic or structural. The former view fo-
cuses upon "press" acts of individuals - i.e., protecting individuals as they
act in press-related manners, such as publishing or gathering news. The
latter view examines the protections given to the press as a structural part
of our society. The determination of this initial question influences the type
of specific judicial protections which may be given under first amendment
case law.
Coinciding with the lack of consensus concerning the meaning of the
press clause is public criticism and distrust of the press. Many of the at-
tacks focus on media ownership, which is becoming increasingly concen-
trated." As a result, competition in the newspaper industry has greatly
declined. This concentration in ownership has been criticized on the follow-
ing grounds: (1) that it poses a danger to diversity of ideas and frustrates
the concept of a marketplace of ideas;12 and (2) that such concentration
frustrates citizen participation in government.1 3
9. Stewart, supra note 8, at 634.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Johnson & Hoak, Media Concentration: Some Observations on the United States'
Experience, 56 IOWA L. REV. 267 (1970).
12. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974), the Court ac-
knowledged the adverse implications of concentrated media ownership. The Court also com-
mented upon the declining number of newspapers, the development of newspaper chains, national
newspapers and wire services, the prevalence of single newspaper cities, and the elimination of
competition among various media within a geographic area.
Former President Carter drew attention to the dilemma posed by this concentration in re-
sponding to false allegations made by the only remaining daily newspaper in Washington. The
newspaper alleged that Carter bugged Blair House while it was occupied by President-elect Rea-
gan. In so responding, Carter observed that, unlike himself, the great majority of Americans lack
sufficient access to the press in order to correct falsehoods a newspaper may spread. Carter Drops
Plans for Suit Against Post, Washington Post, October 25, 1981, at 7, col. 2.
13. As one author explains, "[c]entralization of communications and denial of access to the
media isolate the individual and discourage his responsible participation in public affairs." Bar-
row, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGs L.J.
659, 661 (1975).
In addition, courts have also become aware of the need for a competitive media, and of the
dangers posed by the increased concentration of ownership in the media industry. The courts have
been especially vigilant in enforcing the antitrust laws when dealing with the structures and prac-
tices of the communication industry. In 1953, the Supreme Court stated that "[a] vigorous and
dauntless press is a chief source feeding the flow of democratic expression and controversy which
maintains the institutions of a free society." Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 602 (1953). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has placed an affirmative
duty on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to encourage competition. In Joseph v.
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These criticisms are important in understanding not only the distinction
between the speech and press clauses, but also the nature of the press clause
itself. A theory of the press clause must address the major criticisms,
problems and inadequacies of the press. Furthermore, the criticism may
also show that judicial focus on protecting free speech may not adequately
protect a free press.
This article argues that the speech and press clauses differ in respect to
the scope and nature of their protections. The speech clause is individualis-
tic in nature and inures primarily to the speech activities of an individual.
The press clause is structural in that it concerns the press industry and
protects an open and competitive press. Because the press clause is struc-
tural in nature, the "revised marketplace" metaphor provides the best
model with which to properly analyze the press clause. The "revised mar-
ketplace" metaphor - based somewhat on a literal or physical interpreta-
tion of the long-standing but perhaps somewhat outdated Holmesian
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor 4 
- looks more to the structure and
makeup of the press industry and less to its particular powers than does the
"fourth estate" model previously discussed.
FCC, 404 F.2d 207, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court stated that "[t]he public welfare requires the
Commission to provide the 'widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antago-
nistic sources' and to guard against undue concentration of control of the communications
power." Id. at 211 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)); see also
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
In a more recent decision, Judge Tamm, after discussing the necessity of a free and competitive
media, went on to write that "lilt is also becoming increasingly obvious that application of anti-
trust doctrines in regulating the mass media is not solely a question of sound economic policy; it is
also an important means of achieving the goals posited by the first amendment." Hale v. FCC,
425 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Tamm, J., concurring). Further, Judge Tamm stated that a
democracy will have failed if the people "feel that they are being cheated out of the vigorous
marketplace of ideas promised by the first amendment." Id. at 566.
The courts have allowed the FCC to promulgate regulations on media ownership and concen-
tration. See I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983) (outlines the history underlying the
regulation of the broadcast media by the FCC). The courts have also applied antitrust doctrines
to regulation of the mass media, not only as a matter of sound economic policy, but also as a
means of achieving diversity of ownership and, hence, diversity of ideas; see, e.g., Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Indeed, growing fears that media concentration is hostile to
basic principles of free thought and speech, and threatens the very fabric of American society,
have led to governmental efforts to regulate media ownership through an affirmative diversifica-
tion policy. Cronkite, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society Part III: Points of Con-
flict - Legal Issues Confronting the Media Today, 60 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1006 (1972).
14. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). This theory has lost favor among scholars who recognize
that because of the degree of media concentration, a true "marketplace of ideas" no longer exists;
see, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641
(1967).
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The "marketplace of ideas" model first espoused by Justice Holmes
served as a justification for free speech. According to the marketplace
model, speech must be protected because it brings diversity, competition
and efficiency to the collective search for truth. 5 The model,.assuming the
attainment of truth as resulting from a marketplace of ideas, existed for the
protection of the press rather than as a true model of the press. After de-
cades of influence, however, the Holmesian marketplace model has recently
lost favor because a true marketplace no longer exists due to the increased
ownership concentration in the media industry.' 6
While the old "marketplace of ideas" concept has been used to justify
and encourage free speech, it is the thesis of the "revised marketplace"
model that the provision and assurance of a marketplace of competitive and
independent presses lies at the core of the first amendment free press clause.
While the speech clause protects individual autonomy and expression, the
press clause provides a forum for that speech - a means by which persons
can participate in the political process. The "revised marketplace" model
entails a literal interpretation of the free press clause - namely, freedom of
"the press."'" The structural dimension of the free press clause, under this
model, is one of an actual marketplace of communication forums. In addi-
tion, the goals of the "revised marketplace" model are several: truth; indi-
vidual and social interaction; citizen participation in public affairs; and the
maintenance of a non-monopoly press. In contrast, the Holmesian model
looked only to the total amount of diverse speech in society.
A major reason for criticism of the traditional marketplace model is that
competition and open access no longer exist in the newspaper industry. An
assumption behind the first amendment was that any writer could gain ac-
cess to a printing press without the help of government.'" When monopolies
arose in broadcast media, however, the government was quick to impose
regulations ensuring access and diversity of ownership and content. Such
regulations illustrate society's deep concern with concentrated ownership in
15. However, Schmidt perceives that the marketplace of ideas metaphor may be used as a
sword for government intrusion in that risks arise from its emphasis on the value of efficiency. B.
SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS (1976). The danger in thinking about
first amendment problems in that way alone may lead us to shortchange ourselves by forgetting
what is essential to our integrity as a people and by trying to maximize the amount of speech in
the system. See Bollinger, Book Review, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1354, 1361 (1976) (reviewing FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS).
16. See Barron, supra note 14, at 1641 ("But if ever there were a self-operating marketplace of
ideas, it has long ceased to exist.").
17. For a definition of "the press," see Nimmer, supra note 8, at 650. However, this article
will not attempt a definition of the physical characteristics or scope of "the press."
18. Fisher, Free Speech and High Tech (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REV. 981, 983 (1984).
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the media and a desire for a diverse source of news and ideas and for citizen
participation in social communication. These social concerns are frustrated
by the current state of the newspaper industry and by the realization that it
no longer performs a marketplace function. However, simply because the
nature of the press industry today is not conducive to producing diverse
speech reflecting a "marketplace of ideas," it is not necessary to altogether
abandon the marketplace metaphor on the assumption that our first amend-
ment theory should be based upon a recognition and approval of the cur-
rent conditions and trends in the newspaper industry.
This article will draw a distinction between the free press and the free
speech clauses. In so doing, the distinct values and functions of a free press
will be outlined. The conclusion reached is that the press clause is struc-
tural in nature and that this structural aspect is better described by the
"revised marketplace" model than by the "fourth estate" model. Further-
more, an historical analysis of the press industry at the time of the drafting
and ratification of the first amendment supports the "revised marketplace"
model as best reflecting the framers' intentions.
II. THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY TODAY
A. Concentration of Media Ownership
A great discrepancy exists between the framers' experience with a free
press and the reality existing today in the newspaper industry. 19 When the
framers drafted the first amendment, a true marketplace composed of many
competitive and independent presses existed in which access to channels of
communication was relatively easy.2° The communications industry, how-
ever, has since concentrated into fewer hands limiting the ability to partici-
pate effectively in public debate.
Newspaper competition has greatly decreased in recent years. While
the total number of newspapers has not substantially decreased, the number
of communities with commercially competing daily newspapers under sepa-
rate ownership has decreased dramatically.21 For instance, in 1910 there
19. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 737, 751 (1977). For a discussion of the economic history of the print media and its
relevance to the first amendment, see B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 33-85 (1975).
20. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974).
21. Newspaper Preservation Act, 1969: Hearings on H.R. 279 Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 105 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings
on H.R. 279]; see also B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 39-45. Professor Schmidt states that:
The typical American lives in a city served by a newspaper that is a local monopoly and is
owned by the same interests that control one of the local television stations. Both the
[Vol. 72:187
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were 2,202 daily newspapers in 689 cities. However, by 1968 these figures
had declined to 1,749 and 45 respectively.2 2 From 1923 to 1973, the per-
centage of newspapers facing direct competition from another newspaper
dropped from 60 to 5.4%.23 As concentration has increased, newspaper
publishing has shifted from editor-ownership to group-ownership. By 1971,
about one-half of the nation's daily newspapers were absentee-owned by
corporate chains.24
B. Criticisms and Concerns Over Media Concentration
Serious concerns about traditional first amendment assumptions have
been raised by the trend toward concentration and centralization of the
communications media.25 The concerns are that concentration may reduce
the diversity of ideas expressed, preclude widespread public participation in
newspaper and TV station are, in turn, likely to be either part of a centrally controlled
chain that holds numerous broadcasting stations or newspapers, or part of a conglomerate
corporation with numerous interests that are potentially in conflict with unbiased report-
ing.... [M]ost of the news conveyed by the local paper, and even more of the news that is
broadcast in the area, will have emanated from one of two national wire services.
Id. at 45-46.
22. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 40 (citing 1969 Hearings on H.R. 279, at 198). Of those
communities served by newspapers, approximately 57% had separately owned competing newspa-
pers in 1909 to 1910, compared to 3% in 1968. According to the "downward spiral" or "vicious
cycle" theory, on which the Newspaper Preservation Act is based, the interrelationship of the
quality, circulation, and advertising revenues of a newspaper creates a "natural monopoly" that
can result in one-newspaper cities. Id. at 52-53.
23. B. OWEN, supra note 19, at 49. Thus, the transition of communications enterprises from
persuasion tools to profit instruments has been characterized by a substantial decline in competi-
tion and an accompanying increase in concentration. See Lively & Leahy, Government and the
Media: Regulating a First Amendment Value System, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 913, 914 (1979).
24. H. BRUCKER, COMMUNICATION IS POWER 333 (1973). The hallmarks of newspaper
publishing have become newspaper chains, national newspapers, and national wire services. See
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974).
According to Professor Schmidt, the emergence of a modern mass media invites analysis that
is predicated not on a marketplace of ideas presuming direct citizen participation, but upon recog-
nition of an increasingly centralized mass media with economic and organizational barriers to
entry that make individual participation virtually impossible. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15; see also
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 196 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For other discussions on concentration of the newspaper industry, see Barrow, supra note 13,
at 685; Ervin, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society Part I" Foundation Media -
Evolution of Printed Communication, 60 GEO. L.J. 871, 892-93 (1972).
Newspapers rarely meet the image of an independent editor-publisher daily putting forth his
personal interpretation of events and public issues. Instead, newspapers frequently are merely one
link in a chain of similar businesses which are components of a larger conglomerate. See Bollin-
ger, supra note 15, at 1354.
25. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 37; see also Johnson & Hoak, supra note 11, at 276.
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the exchange of ideas, and create imbalances and inequalities in the commu-
nications marketplace.26
The opposition to media concentration rests largely on the traditional
notion of a marketplace of ideas. According to traditional theory, diversity
of ideas is linked to diversity of media ownership.27 The danger is that a
pluralistic society cannot function properly and continually with a large
part of its population cut off from access to the media, unable to communi-
cate and to organize with those of similar persuasion and interests, and un-
able to debate with and possibly convert those of differing views. A healthy
democracy requires a free and open debate of public issues, which may not
be possible with a highly concentrated press. The Commission on Freedom
of the Press concluded that the press was not fulfilling this responsibility to
society and warned: "[N]o democracy, certainly not the American democ-
racy, will indefinitely tolerate concentration of private power irresponsible
and strong enough to thwart the aspirations of the people."'28 The genera-
lized fear is that centralization of communications and difficulty of access to
the media may isolate the individual and discourage his or her participation
in public affairs.2 9
Two additional aspects of competitive newspapers are important. First,
newspapers give expression and identity to their communities, and their dis-
appearance can diminish local morale and civic spirit.3 Second, a large
number of competitive newspapers makes news management difficult. Dur-
ing World War II, the nation's newspapers proved the least malleable of all
the mass media. They were too numerous and too heterogeneous in out-
look to be "managed" by the government.3
The courts have always been aware of the importance of a competitive
media.32 They have been especially vigilant in enforcing the antitrust laws
26. Barron, supra note 14, at 1647-48.
27. Johnson & Hoak, supra note 11, at 275. The Supreme Court has also voiced this attitude
in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
28. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 80 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office, 1947).
29. Barrow, supra note 13, at 661.
30. Lichfy, Video Versus Print, 1982 THE WILSON Q. 47, 71 (special ed.).
31. Steele, The Great Debate: Roosevelt, the Media, and the Coming of the War, 1940- 1941,
J. AM. HIST. 29 (June, 1984).
32. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 ("Surely a command that the government itself shall
not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom."). In Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), the Court stated that: "It is the purpose of the first amend-
ment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee." Id. at 390.
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when dealing with the structure and practices of the communications indus-
tries. Enforcement of the antitrust laws serves the first amendment goal in
assuring the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
sources.3 3 Congress has also been concerned with the concentration of me-
dia ownership and the disappearance of competition. The concern over a
decline in competitive newspapers prompted Congress to pass the Newspa-
per Preservation Act (NPA) in 1970.11 As competitive newspapers went
out of business at an alarming rate, the NPA's supporters argued that the
NPA was essential to preserve an abundance of editorial viewpoints. In-
deed, of approximately 1,700 papers existing today, only 30 are truly
competitive.
In addition to this increasing concentration in the newspaper industry, a
number of recent books and studies document the public's suspicion and
distrust of the press. Because of this public distrust, much first amendment
press law currently arises out of the relationship between the press and the
public rather than from the relationship between the press and the govern-
ment as was the case in the 1950's and 1960's.
This public suspicion and distrust of the press is illustrated in Suing the
Press.36 Author Rodney Smolla discusses and examines recent libel suits.
He labels the libel explosion a "cultural movement" and "one of America's
newest growth industries., 37 Smolla also recognizes that juries demonstrate
great sympathy for libel plaintiffs, which may result from the underlying
public distrust of the press that arose in the wake of Watergate and
Vietnam.
The growing concentration in the media industry and the resulting pub-
lic opinion fallout is seen in The Media Elite: America's New Power Bro-
kers. The authors point out that for several years it has been increasingly
obvious to the public that those in the media do not represent a cross-sec-
tion of America.38 In The War Against the Press, Peter Stoler also elabo-
rates upon Smolla's idea that generous libel awards demonstrate that
33. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20, 28-29; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1970).
35. Passed by overwhelming margins in both houses, the NPA allows newspapers in a com-
munity - where one paper is failing - to combine their business and printing operations by
entering into a joint operating agreement, as long as their editorial departments remain separate.
And with the recent failure of several large newspapers, particularly the St. Louis Globe-Demo-
crat, the use and value of the NPA has been renewed. Doll, Antitrust Law Meets the Press, Nat'l
L.J., October 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
36. R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS (1986).
37. Id. at 2-5.
38. S. LICHTER, S. ROTHMAN & L. LICHTER, THE MEDIA ELITE: AMERICA'S NEW POWER
BROKERS (1986).
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ordinary citizens who make up juries feel estranged from the press. Fur-
ther, Stoler also documents the press' unpopularity. 39 Finally, an Iowa libel
study found that libel plaintiffs, although as a group not especially litigious,
sue because of their outrage at the actions of the press and because an unre-
sponsive press often does not react or respond to the plaintiffs' concerns or
complaints.4' These books and studies provide yet another example of the
erosion and weaknesses of the "fourth estate" model and the cause of the
public backlash against the press. A powerful press, without sufficient ac-
countability and without adequate means for allowing public participation,
is both the consequence of the "fourth estate" model and the cause of this
public backlash.
III. THE DIFFERENCES IN THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
AND THE FREE PRESS CLAUSE
A. Introduction
A theory of a free press must meet and address the widespread criticism
outlined above. It must also fulfill the values that a free press should serve.
The "revised marketplace" model proposed in this article makes such an
attempt.
Initially, the inquiry aims at distinguishing the speech and press clauses.
Thus, the particular values of a free press must be defined. The differences
between the values of free speech and free press will outline the differences
between the two clauses.
Much of the current debate over the press clause centers on whether the
speech and press clauses protect different freedoms. This debate was fueled
by Justice Stewart's suggestion that there may be distinct functions and fea-
tures of "the press" that ought to be constitutionally protected by the
Court.4 Indeed, the first amendment appears on its face to imply that
''press" cases should not be treated as universally identical with "speech"
cases in first amendment litigation.42
The prevailing theories on the distinction between the press and speech
clauses focus on whether the press should be treated the same as or differ-
39. P. STOLER, THE WAR AGAINST THE PRESS (1986).
40. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND
REALITY (1987).
41. Stewart, supra note 8, at 631.
42. The first amendment sets forth a specific and additional prohibition of abridgements on
freedom of the press: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or [the
freedom] of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ently than the public.43 Those that believe the press should be treated dif-
ferently generally adhere to the theory of the press as a "fourth estate" of
government; the theory being that the press serves primarily as an agent to
alert the public of abuses and incidents of corruption in government. The
question, however, is whether one can accept a distinction between the
press and speech clauses but not automatically follow the "fourth estate"
model. While this article agrees that the press clause contains a separate
institutional or structural protection for the press, thus affording different
protections than does the speech clause, it postulates a different role and
values of a free press and argues that the appropriate model for this struc-
tural protection is not the "fourth estate watchdog" theory of Justice Stew-
art, but the "revised marketplace" model set forth here.
B. Values of a Free Press Under the 'Revised Marketplace" Model
1. The Attainment of Truth From a Diverse Source of Ideas
The traditional marketplace of ideas theory preceded the adoption of
the first amendment by well over a century. John Milton wrote in criticism
of the English licensing system that truth is best achieved and falsehood
best suppressed when they face each other through expression in print.'
Further, the writings of John Stewart Mill, which greatly influenced the
development of first amendment doctrine, demonstrate the development of
the marketplace theory at the time of ratification of the first amendment.45
Significantly, Mill did not advocate free expression for any intrinsic value;
rather, he advocated it as the best method of achieving a more fundamental
goal - truth. This view of the first amendment ultimately found its judi-
cial expression in Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" theory.46
43. For a discussion of whether the press should be treated differently than the general public,
see Van Alstyne, supra note 8. Former Justice Powell and Justice Douglas have perhaps been the
most emphatic advocates of the proposition that the press should be treated differently than the
public for first amendment purposes. Justice Powell has said that in investigating the news, "the
press ... acts as an agent of the public at large." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas has also said that "the press has a preferred posi-
tion in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a
favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 839 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
44. COMMENTARY TO JOHN MILTON (R. Jebb ed. 1918); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (1960).
45. The Supreme Court quoted Mill extensively in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 272, 279 (1964).
46. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This view was also
restated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the
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2. Promotion of Representative Self-Government
The promotion of representative self-government is closely related to
the attainment of truth, as the promotion of truth inevitably leads to a more
reasoned government. Indeed, one principle of first amendment interpreta-
tion commanding nearly universal agreement is that a primary purpose of
the amendment is to sustain the process of representative self-government
so clearly created in the constitutional scheme.4 7 The Supreme Court has
on several occasions recognized this as a primary function of freedom of
speech.48 In dissent, Justice Brennan has stated that the first amendment
"prohibits the state from interfering with the communicative processes
through which its citizens exercise and prepare to exercise their rights of
self-government." 4 9 However, yet to be fully explored are the implications
of this important relationship between first amendment guarantees and con-
stitutionally established democratic processes.5 ° The proposed "revised
marketplace" model posits a close relationship between the free press clause
and our constitutional democratic political processes.
A free press aids in the promotion of self-government in two ways.
First, it facilitates the formation and the existence of majority rule; and
secondly, it promotes the rational and well-reasoned functioning of govern-
ment. Alexander Meiklejohn is one of the foremost authors on this latter
value of a free press.5" To Meiklejohn, a central, if not exclusive, purpose of
the first amendment is to sustain the process of representative self-govern-
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... ").
47. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression .... "); City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972); Red Lion Broadcasting 395 U.S. at 390; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
("The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.").
49. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
50. Some scholars hold that the first amendment's sole purpose is to support democracy. See
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1960); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
Even those writers who reject the exclusiveness of this view of the first amendment's purpose
acknowledge the importance of the first amendment to the public's participation in political deci-
sion making. See T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 7.
51. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26-27, 88-
89 (1948).
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ment 2 Professor Meiklejohn saw the self-government rationale as a func-
tion distinct from the enlightenment function:
The First Amendment is not, primarily, a device for the winning of
new truth, though that is very important. It is a device for the shar-
ing of whatever truth has been won. Its purpose is to give to every
voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation
in the understanding of those problems with which the citizen of a
self-governing society must deal.5 3
This value, sometimes called the democratic dialogue function, is espe-
cially applicable to the press. 4 Communication through the press contrib-
utes more significantly to the democratic dialogue than does speech
conducted through other channels. 5 Newspapers, of all the media forms,
provide for the greatest degree of citizen participation. The distinction is
that anyone may publish his or her views in a newspaper, but may not have
the millions of dollars needed to develop their own cable system.
56
Not only does a free press aid in the rational functioning of self-govern-
ment, but it also promotes citizen participation in government and the for-
mation of political groups and political majorities. Professor Ely's process-
view of the Constitution recognizes that the Constitution's main function is
to allow groups and individuals to form political coalitions and majorities
through the democratic process.5 7 The press allows, or should allow, a
greater degree of cohesion and communication among members of political
groups and between different political groups. In turn, more people are
brought into the democratic process.
This view also carries beyond the political arena. It embraces the right
to participate in the building of society and culture, and includes freedom of
expression in religion, art and science. Furthermore, the process of open
communication through the press promotes greater cohesion in a society
52. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
53. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 75.
54. Nimmer, supra note 8, at 653 ("The informing and opinion shaping function of the press
is unquestioned.").
55. Id.
56. Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 773 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1985).
57. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term,
Forward On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Ely, Toward a Repre-
sentation - Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978).
Some scholars have also written that the first amendment free press clause should serve an
equalizing function. See Meister, Journalistic Silence and Governmental Speech: Can Institutions
Have Rights?, 16 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 319 (1981). Such a function would require the press
to act as a forum for oppressed or minority groups or to conduct investigations into systematic
oppression. Thus, when performing such a function, the press would be given special rights.
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because people are more open to decisions that go against them if they have
a part in the decision-making process. Freedom of expression thus provides
a framework in which social conflict can take place without destroying the
society. Our society is a pluralistic one, and a close connection exists be-
tween an open and competitive press and the promotion of pluralism. 8
3. Promotion of Society and Culture Compatible with
Democratic Government
Social bonds between individuals require a means or forum through
which those individuals may communicate. Irrespective of its relation to
democratic government, free and open communication is essential for the
formation and maintenance of society. Society, in turn, is a prerequisite for
self-government. This distinction between society and government was also
apparent to the framers. 9
The press provides the primary forum and vehicle for the type of broad-
based participatory communication needed for such society-building. °
Free and open communication also constitutes a precondition for the exist-
ence of all forms of political organizations.61 Freedom of communication
58. In Technologies of Freedom, Pool presents an even broader issue: In a democracy depen-
dent upon the free exchange of ideas, what is to become of that system if society grows dependent
upon a communication system that is extensively regulated or monopolized? A similar question
concerns the fate of freedom if society grows dependent upon a communication system that is
overly concentrated and monopolistic. The heart of Pool's thesis is that resource availability
ought to determine the degree of regulation. To the extent that resources for an important com-
munications medium are genuinely scarce or are monopolized, governmental regulation may be
necessary, but only to ensure open access. To the extent that a communications medium is decen-
tralized and dispersed, little governmental regulation is required. Thus, regulation is a last re-
course according to Pool, legitimate only if an important communications medium is truly
monopolistic. These principles make it clear that Pool is a pluralist; they reflect his goal of ensur-
ing that all speakers have maximum opportunity to speak. I. POOL, supra note 13, at 9-10, 234-
40, 246.
59. E. FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 92 (1976).
60. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 6-7. According to Dr. Hannah Arendt:
A life without speech.., has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among
men. Communication affirms our reality, because we are perceived by others. Without
speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one's self nor of the surrounding
world can be known.
H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 175-78 (1958). Freedom of speech among individuals
creates social cohesion. See Schneider, Social Rights and the Concept of Human Rights, in POLIT-
ICAL THEORY IN THE RIGHTS OF MAN 81 (D.D. Raphael ed. 1967).
61. See generally L. GOODWIN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT IN
AMERICA (1976). One of the axioms of modern communications research holds that the structure
of social communication reflects the structure and development of society. Weir, The Role of the
Newspaper Press in the Southern Colonies on the Eve of the Revolution: An Interpretation, in THE
PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 102 (B. Bailyn & J. Hench eds. 1980).
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gives individuals the power to create a common, public world, which is a
prerequisite to the political organization of society.
A number of writers, particularly John Dewey, have expressed the view
that the conditions for democracy must exist in a culture and society in
order for democracy to flourish and function.62 Democratic governments
arise out of democratic societies and cultures. Dewey, in fact, theorized
that political freedom could not be maintained without the freedom of cul-
ture - a freedom commonly thought of as the result of political freedom.
He stated that:
[T]he relations which exist between persons, outside of political in-
stitutions, relations of industry, of communication, of science, art
and religion, affect daily associations, and thereby deeply affect the
attitudes and habits expressed in government and rules of law....
The problem is to know what kind of culture is so free in itself that it
conceives and begets political freedom as an accompaniment and
consequence.63
Dewey thus believed that "[t]he problem of freedom and of democratic
institutions is tied up with the question of what kind of culture exists; with
the necessity of free culture for free political institutions." ' Dewey further
wrote that:
The problem of freedom of cooperative individualities is then a prob-
lem to be viewed in the context of culture. The state of culture is a
state of interaction of many factors, the chief of which are law and
politics, industry and commerce, science and technology, the arts of
expression and communication, and of morals, or the values men
prize and the ways in which they evaluate them; and finally, though
indirectly, the system of general ideas used by men to justify and to
criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live, their so-
cial philosophy.
Applying Dewey's theories, free and open expression is one of those es-
sential conditions to creating a free culture, which in turn will maintain a
free, democratic political order. A free, independent and open press consti-
tutes a primary condition for creating the free social environment essential
to a democracy. A free press, by disseminating public views and by al-
lowing active citizen participation in the dissemination of opinions, contrib-
utes to a democratic society and culture. Professor Levy, in studying
America and the remarkable freedom enjoyed by the colonial press, also
62. J. DEVEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 6 (1939).
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id. at 6.
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found that the early Americans regarded a free press as the prerequisite to a
republican government.66
A closely related social value of a free press lies in what has been termed
the "safety valve" function of the first amendment.67 A free press serves a
valuable function in society by giving minorities access to the rest of society
and to the political arena. Thus, minority groups are not completely shut
out of the public sphere and political arena. In addition, the "safety valve"
theory suggests that a free press also permits those in power to learn about
and respond to grievances before citizens in general become irretrievably
alienated.68
A number of recent studies of the press have likewise taken a broad
social view of the press. Rather than looking at the press from strictly a
legal or journalistic view, these scholars incorporate a social, cultural and
political viewpoint.69 They reveal social values achieved through a free
press and offer social or cultural views of the first amendment. The par-
ticipatory value of the free press is illustrated in The Power of the Press.v°
Professor Leonard theorizes that creation of a democratic form of govern-
ment did not necessarily create public participation in that government.
This latter achievement was due to the press. 71 Leonard writes that the
nature of political reporting significantly influenced the nature of American
politics. He demonstrates the political role of the press and the connection
between voting and communicating. Leonard's historical analysis shows
66. See L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 184 (1985).
67. While this value is primarily a sociological one, it has gained legal recognition. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); COMMIS-
SION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 28, at 113; Barron, supra note 14, at 1650; see also
F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 6 (1981).
68. Blasi, supra note 8, at 550. There may also be a safety valve function for the audience as
well as the speaker. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (Bur-
ger, C.J., plurality opinion) ("Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct
are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest
themselves in some form of vengeful 'self-help,' as indeed they did regularly in the activities of
vigilante 'committees' on our frontiers.").
Professor Emerson suggests as a fourth function of the "safety valve" theory the promotion of
"orderly social change" or maintenance of "a balance between stability and change." See Emer-
son, supra note 3, at 428. Bork, on the other hand, argues that since the "safety valve" function
raises only issues of prudence, it therefore raises issues to be determined by the legislature or by
the executive. Bork, supra note 50, at 25.
69. See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); T. LEONARD, THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE BIRTH OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL REPORTING (1986); N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTER-
PRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL (1986); R. SMOLLA, supra note 36.
70. T. LEONARD, supra note 69.
71. Id. at 6-7.
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that the press plays a greater political role than that envisioned by advo-
cates of the "fourth estate" model of the press. However, Leonard also
warns of the harm which can result from a concentration of "fourth estate"
powers of the press. When the press focuses less on transmitting informa-
tion and achieving a free flow of ideas, and focuses more upon its role as an
aloof critic and investigator, it attains an existence quite separate from soci-
ety and can lose touch with the public. This in turn diminishes public in-
volvement in political communication and in politics.72
In Protecting the Best Men,73 Professor Rosenberg also discusses the so-
cial and political values and functions of the press. He demonstrates the
close link between social and political changes and open communication
channels provided by the press. Rosenberg shows a close connection be-
tween a free press and the proper functioning of our political processes in
his discussion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.74 The libel law at issue in
Sullivan constituted a blockage of the political process and had a chilling
effect on political discussion. The concern for a legitimate and open polit-
ical process dictated the application of the first amendment to libel laws in
Sullivan. Rosenberg's discussion of the Sullivan case displays the value of
the press in providing for open participation in public debate.75
The press must be understood as an integral part of the social and polit-
ical process. This socially interactive aspect of the press is illustrated best in
The Tolerant Society.76 Professor Bollinger offers a social interaction the-
ory of speech based upon a "social behavior" model. The value of protect-
ing extremist speech, according to Bollinger, lies in its promotion of the
vitally important social trait of tolerance. The tolerance theory focuses not
so much on the substance of the speech or on the right to speak as it does on
the act of communicating and the value of tolerating. Bollinger essentially
uses a community-building model based on the importance of tolerance to a
society. He offers a vision of a better society through exercise of the first
amendment. According to Bollinger, "there have been few serious attempts
to integrate into the general free speech discourse a more complex and real-
istic view of modern society."7 7 It is especially interesting to note, however,
that Bollinger's theory seeks to build and promote a certain type of society,
rather than a certain type and quality of government as other models of free
speech have attempted.
72. See id.
73. N. ROSENBERG, supra note 69.
74. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75. N. ROSENBERG, supra note 69.
76. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 69.
77. Id. at 74.
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Bollinger recognizes the political ramifications of a social-based theory
of free speech:
Protection [of speech] is not... logically compelled by some general
commitment to the search for truth or the democratic ideal .... It
is, rather, a matter of self-protective political strategy, a response to
a perceived reality of ever-threatening intolerance and prejudice by
the politically powerful against the politically weak.7 8
Bollinger's "social interaction" theory of the first amendment gives potent
ammunition to those critics of the "fourth estate" model of the free press
clause. The "fourth estate" model focuses primarily on the role of an un-
checked press acting as a powerful institutional "watchdog" over the ex-
cesses of a powerful government. In this model, the press does not interact
with society. Under Bollinger's theory, however, the press acts as a com-
municative tool or forum for the promotion of tolerance and the building of
community. Bollinger posits that a central function of free speech is to pro-
vide a social context in which we collectively speak.7 9 This social function
is not served by the "fourth estate" model. Social communication and in-
teraction can thrive only through the proper press forums.
4. A Watchdog on Government: The Press as the "Fourth Estate"
A free press may alert the public to abuse and corruption in govern-
ment. This "watchdog" role is served when the press discovers and dissem-
inates information about activities otherwise kept secret by the
government.8 0 Former Supreme Court Justice Stewart has been an advo-
cate of this theory. According to Justice Stewart, the primary purpose of
the free press clause is to create an institution outside the government to
serve as an additional check on the three governmental branches.8 1 Not
surprisingly, the "fourth estate" theory followed on the heels of the shift
toward "adversary journalism" that took place in the 1960's and intensified
in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam. 2
78. Id. at 99.
79. Id. at 120.
80. This value is discussed in Blasi, supra note 8, at 521.
81. Stewart, supra note 8, at 634. The Court has continued to stress this structural, adver-
sarial role. As Justice Brennan stated in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587, "[tjhe First
Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative in-
terchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republi-
can system of self-government." Id. Thus, this checking value envisions the press as an
independent check on the government.
82. B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 58-59. According to Schmidt, the Vietnam War was criti-
cal in changing the attitude of journalists toward their government: "The radical perspective of
journalist I.F. Stone ('[e]very government is run by liars and nothing they say should be believed')
became an accepted premise of reporting about the war." Id. at 59 (quoting KIGHTLEY, THE
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The watchdog theory was first proposed by Professor Blasi.83 However,
Blasi holds a more passive view of the watchdog function than Justice Stew-
art and sees this function as distinct from the self-governing rationale. He
states that the role of the individual is not so much to contribute on a con-
tinuing basis to the formation of public policy as it is to retain a veto power
to be used when the decisions of governmental officials exceed certain
bounds.84 His view, however, contradicts the value of constant citizen par-
ticipation and decision-making - a value which is advanced by the "re-
vised marketplace" theory.
Under the "fourth estate" theory, the press occupies, in effect, a fourth
branch of government. To empower the press to fulfill such a role, "fourth
estatists" argue that the press should have special rights of access to gather
news. Thus, a "free press" is a "powerful press." On the other hand, the
revised marketplace model, while valuing an overseer function of the press,
does not elevate the press to a specially-appointed role as public agent. Nor
does it envision the granting of special privileges to an already concentrated
press as essential to the functioning of a free press in a democratic society.
C. The Different Values Protected by the Two Clauses
1. Individualistic versus Social Values
The speech and press clauses serve different values and confer different
protections. The speech clause assures each individual the freedom of ex-
pression, whether the words be spoken or printed. The press clause, how-
ever, addresses the system of dissemination of those views in society. It
assures an open forum for communication and for political participation.
The differences between the clauses are based upon the separate values
served and protected by each.
One difference lies in the value of individual autonomy and dignity. In-
dividual free expression, protected by the free speech clause, preserves the
FIRST CASUALTY 373 (1975)). Schmidt also states that the growth of serious radical and
countercultural movements led to an adversarial role between press and government. As the press
reported about activities of legal disobedience by these groups in the 1960's, law enforcement
officials found journalists with information about militant groups to be tempting sources of infor-
mation. Id. at 60. A deluge of subpoenas and investigations left journalists with the attitude that
government wished to cut off its flow of information. As a result, many journalists viewed cooper-
ation with law enforcement authorities as a threat to their ability to investigate. Id.
83. Blasi, supra note 8.
84. Id. at 542. According to Blasi, the "checking value is concerned not with the general
process of selecting the best persons for office but with the narrower task of preventing abuses of
the public trust." Id. at 584.
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individual's dignity and right to govern his or her own lifeY This self-
fulfillment function of speech does not equally apply to the press, especially
given the corporate make-up of the media.8 6 While the free speech clause
may be based upon the view that society must respect individual autonomy
as an end in itself, the press clause is directed more to the dissemination of
those views in society and to the nature of the forum disseminating those
views.87
Former Supreme Court Justice Powell's opinions illustrate this point
and show that we can distinguish the speech and press clauses without ac-
cepting the "fourth estate" model. In his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co. ,88 and his opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti,89 Justice Pow-
ell espoused a process-protective, societal-function theory of the first
amendment. Citing Professor Chafee's observation that the guarantee of
freedom of speech and press protects two kinds of interests, Justice Powell
distinguished between the individualistic values and the societal function of
the first amendment in preserving a marketplace of free public discussion.9"
The societal function follows from the first amendment's concern with dem-
ocratic processes:
No aspect of that constitutional guarantee [of the first amendment]
is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our
people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their
own destiny. "[T]he First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks
of our national commitment to intelligent self-government." 91
Insofar as the press serves this societal function and advances democratic
process-related concerns, it is entitled to first amendment protection.
85. One author has said that "[t]he value of free expression rests on its deep relation to self-
respect arising from autonomous self-determination without which the life of the spirit is meager
and slavish." Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
86. Nimmer, supra note 8, at 654 ("To be sure, the individual contributor to the press makes
variant self-fulfillment by the publication of his work. But for the press qua press, apart from the
individual pamphleteer, it is unlikely that this is a significant factor.").
87. For a discussion of the liberty theory of free speech, see Baker, Scope of the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech, 26 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978). In a later paper, Professor Baker dis-
cusses the view that since the press is a commercial enterprise, its speech lacks the individual
liberty and self-realization aspects of speech that justify its constitutional protection for individu-
als. Thus, the value of individual liberty is not closely connected with the activities of the press.
See Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819
(1980) [hereinafter Press Rights].
88. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
90. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 862 (citation omitted). In his dissent, Powell agreed with Justice Stewart's major
premise that neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have constitutional rights
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The significance of distinguishing claims related to the process-protec-
tive, societal function of the first amendment from those based upon its
individualistic values lies in a new distinction between the speech and press
clauses and the values served by each clause. The societal-function view
permits the Court to derive constitutional rights from what is necessary to
protect the integrity of an ongoing political and social process. Under the
revised marketplace model, such a view would then necessitate protection
of a competitive press. Rather than protecting certain individual rights or
activities, the press clause protects certain aspects of the democratic process
and the communicative process necessary for self-government. In effect,
the press clause protects the channels of communication and the communi-
cation process, rather than the specific individual utterances or activities of
the press that are protected by the speech clause. The individualistic and
societal values of the first amendment coincide with the speech and press
clauses, and the societal function relates to maintenance of a communica-
tion forum made up of a free and competitive press.
2. The Free Press and Free Speech Clauses: The Analogy to Positive
versus Negative Liberties
Two prominent themes exist in the judicial and philosophical justifica-
tions for free speech and free press. One emphasizes the role of free speech
in individual self-expression and development of individual potential; the
other stresses the value of free expression to a system of self-government.
92
The individual self-expression theme sees the first amendment as ensuring a
sphere of liberty to the individual. The second theme uses the first amend-
ment to protect the workings of government, rather than to protect expres-
sions as a private liberty of the individual.
Isaiah Berlin has labeled the first theme or concept of liberty as a nega-
tive freedom - an individual's freedom from government interference.93
superior to those of the general public. Id. at 857. However, Powell did not view this concession
as fatal because of the individualistic and societal interests protected by the first amendment.
While Justice Stewart viewed the plaintiff's claim in Saxbe as staking out an area of special
press privilege, thus implicating only the individualist values of the first amendment, Powell in-
sisted the plaintiff's claim in Saxbe implicated systematic, process-related concerns - the societal
function of the first amendment. See LeVier, Justice Powell and the First Amendment's Societal
Function: A Preliminary Analysis, 68 VA. L. REv. 177 (1982). According to Powell, the plaintiffs
in Saxbe were seeking constitutional protection not as individuals but as agents of the public at
large because "the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the First
Amendment." Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863.
92. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1108 (1980).
93. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969). Berlin holds
the Kantian view that the individual must retain control over some private sphere beyond a gov-
ernment's control where that person can be free; see also Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative
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The latter theme is defined by Berlin as a positive concept of liberty that
constitutes the right to self-government or, more accurately, the power to
self-govern. Applying Berlin's concepts of liberty, the free press clause
serves a positive liberty essential for self-government, while the free speech
clause protects a negative liberty that inures to the individual. The press
clause protects a forum which connects the desires and needs of society
with the actions of government. Without such a forum, a society could not
govern itself. The speech clause, on the other hand, protects that personal
freedom which is essential if we are not "to degrade or deny our nature." 94
Berlin's analysis illustrates a basic distinction between the press and
speech clauses that often goes overlooked. For example, Alexander
Meiklejohn holds that the first amendment has value only in its relation to
self-government. 95 Thus, he views the first amendment as protecting a posi-
tive liberty. Meiklejohn makes no distinction between the press and speech
clauses; but under Berlin's concepts his theory fits only the press clause.
The press clause is the clause in the first amendment directed to a protec-
tion of the political process and the communicative process necessary for
self-government. 96
Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 176 (Ryan ed. 1979). Berlin saw freedom of speech as an
individual negative liberty - the freedom from government restrictions. Berlin valued this liberty
because of its contribution to individual dignity and freedom.
94. Berlin, supra note 93, at 126.
95. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Meiklejohn, First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 245. The first amendment, in Meiklejohn's view, constitutes the repository of self-governing
powers that are immune from governmental regulation. The reserved "self-governing" powers are
concerned not with a private right but with a public power. Meiklejohn argues that the first
amendment is not concerned with a private freedom to speak, but rather with the freedom of those
expressions by which the people govern. Thus, in Meiklejohn's view, the first amendment protects
the presence of self-government. Meiklejohn holds that the first amendment exists primarily as a
power by which people can effectively govern themselves.
Bork argues that self-government constitutes the only legitimate value of the first amendment.
Bork views the first amendment as guaranteeing rights derived from the governmental process
established by the Constitution. Bork, supra note 50.
96. Other authors have also suggested that the framers created a negative liberty in the
speech clause and a positive liberty in the press clause. For a discussion of freedom of speech as a
negative liberty, see the discussion in Meister, supra note 57, at 334-40.
The original provisions of the Constitution conferred liberties in the positive sense. As defined
by Isaiah Berlin, the positive sense of the word liberty "derives from the wish on the part of the
individual to be his own master." Berlin, supra note 93, at 131. The Constitution created demo-
cratic processes by which the American people could be their own masters. The press clause is
one such process and is essential in order for the public to govern themselves. Also, the self-
governing rationale provides the only legitimate justification for the press clause. This argument
is accepted by theorists ranging from Meiklejohn to Justice Stewart in his fourth estate role. Jus-
tice Stewart believes that, while most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific
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The press clause does not focus on the content of the communications.
Rather, it focuses on providing social channels for communications among
citizens and between society and government. The traditional marketplace
metaphor is useful as it describes the type of forum necessary to provide for
expression of diverse opinions and to provide for political participation
among citizens. Unlike the traditional model, however, the revised market-
place model does not use the marketplace idea - the attainment of truth
from diverse speech - only to justify free expression. Rather, the revised
marketplace model envisions the marketplace metaphor as actually describ-
ing the dictates of the free press clause, i.e., the existence of a competitive
industry of newspapers.97
The speech and press clauses can be analogized to the religious exercise
and establishment clauses of the first amendment. The speech clause, like
the free exercise clause, protects the individual's negative liberty. On the
other hand, the press clause, like the establishment clause, protects the pub-
lic interest in a particular structure of nongovernmental or cultural aspects
of society.98 While the establishment clause governs the relationship be-
tween religion and government, the press clause governs the relationship
between speech in society, an open and competitive communication forum,
and the political process.
Both the establishment clause and the press clause protect the indepen-
dence and integrity of vital nongovernmental centers of expression.99 By
analogy, we can interpret some first amendment clauses (free exercise and
speech) as focused on individual liberty, and others (the establishment and
liberties of individuals, the free press clause is a structural provision extending protection to an
institution. Stewart, supra note 8, at 633.
Other authors and judges suggest that the press clause should be seen as a positive liberty.
Justice Stewart stated that the free press guaranty is a structural provision of the Constitution. Id.
This seems to suggest that the institutional press may claim a protected status in the constitutional
system of free expression as a third-party representative of the public. See Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725- 26 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). This
function of the press obviously is closely intertwined with the ability of the public to self-govern.
Another author has stated that the press, in serving an equalizing function, is a necessary institu-
tion to offset the power of government and to help "outside groups" gain access to the political
process. Meister, supra note 57, at 335-56. In this view, the press becomes part of the social
conflict and takes part in politicizing the government. See id. at 363-76 (discussion of the political
roles that the institutional press may play). Thus, if the prime justification for the press is in its
role within the political arena, the freedom of the press clause must be viewed as protecting a
positive liberty.
97. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
98. Bezanson, supra note 8, at 732.
99. Press Rights, supra note 87, at 825.
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press clauses) as focused on principles that govern the relation between gov-
ernment and specific private institutions existing in society.l°0
D. The Free Press Guarantee: A Structural Provision of the Constitution
Justice Stewart has been a firm proponent of a structural view of the
press clause:
Most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific
liberties or specific rights of individuals ... [i]n contrast, the Free
Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing
business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given
explicit constitutional protection. 01
Justice Stewart contends that if the free press guarantee meant no more
than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.
Although Justice Stewart extends institutional protection to the press, he
extends that protection for the primary purpose of creating a "fourth insti-
tution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
branches."' 2 It is possible, however, to apply a structural analysis of the
free press clause without accepting Justice Stewart's "fourth estate" model.
The revised marketplace model posits that the press clause is structural in
nature but does not require an adoption of the "fourth estate" model.
Several Supreme Court opinions have recognized the structural aspect
of the press clause. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court relied on
institutional considerations unrelated to the specific content of the commu-
nication.0 3 Furthermore, the Court continued to stress a structural role in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia."'4 As Justice Brennan stated in
Richmond, "the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to
free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
100. Id. at 827.
101. Stewart, supra note 8, at 633.
102. Id. at 634 ("It is also a mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the constitutional
guarantee of a free press is to insure that a newspaper will serve as a neutral forum for debate, a
'marketplace for ideas.' "). According to Justice Stewart, the marketplace of ideas concept gives
insufficient weight to the institutional autonomy of the press. Id.
103. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The issue in Gertz was the extent of press liability for defamatory
statements about private individuals. The Gertz case is an example of a Supreme Court decision
interpreting the press clause as an institutional protection or at least displaying an increasing
willingness to depart from a unitary free speech and free press right. In its decision, the Court
abandoned its traditional free speech analysis, which had focused on the content of any given
expression and on the character of the purported evil presented. In place of the traditional analy-
sis, the layout emphasized institutional considerations unrelated to context. See Rooney, Freedom
of the Press: An Emerging Privilege, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 33, 38 (1983).
104. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of
self-government." 05
While the Court's use of the structural role of the press focuses on the
role of the press as an adversarial check on government - the watchdog
function - a structural analysis can also be applied by the revised market-
place model to the free press clause. Professor Pool, for instance, uses a
structural analysis and advocates regulation of the media only to the extent
that a particular media actually is monopolized.'° 6 By advocating govern-
ment regulation only when a monopoly exists, Pool argues for a particular
structural nature of the press: That our communication media should be
decentralized, dispersed and competitive.107
Another reason for interpreting the press clause as an institutional or
structural protection lies in the language of the first amendment itself. The
amendment protects the act of speaking, and its protection extends to ac-
tors capable of speaking. The first amendment also protects "the press,"
which is an institutional or structural designation. 10 8 Thomas Jefferson, in
his draft of the Virginia Constitution, proposed the following language:
"[P]rinting presses shall be free .... ."10 9 Again the reference to "printing
presses" is to a physical entity - a means or forum of communicating.
IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COLONIAL AND
REVOLUTIONARY PRESS
A. Current Historical Literature on the Free Press Clause: A Conclusion
of Uncertainty as to the Intent of the Drafters
of the Press Clause
The value of a free press became apparent in many important ways to
Americans during the revolutionary and constitutional periods." 0 The
early political campaigns against British laws and for independence were
transformed into effective national movements by the press."I' A free press
was useful not only in arousing popular support for the revolutionary cause,
but also in shaping new national political institutions.
105. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. I. POOL, supra note 13, at 9-10.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... "). Since there is a strong presumption that words used in a constitu-
tion were chosen for a purpose and are, therefore, not redundant, it follows that the framers
intended to establish two separate freedoms. See Nimmer, supra note 8, at 639-40.
109. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 363 (Boyd, ed. 1950).
110. J. LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT (1980).
111. E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 126-27 (1972).
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Although the American press assumed a larger role in expressing opin-
ion during the revolutionary period, this role was essentially a pragmatic
process that did not arise out of or result in much innovation in the concept
of freedom of expression during that time.1 12 American editors of the time
were indeed committed to something called freedom of the press, but these
editors did not yet articulate the position now generally accepted that pub-
lishers should be free from penalties for their criticism of government.' 13
Moreover, the eighteenth century defenders of a free press were inconsistent
in their positions on who should enjoy the freedom and the degree of the
freedom afforded." 4 Thus, if eighteenth century Americans were unclear
about the meaning of a free press, history has not provided any additional
enlightenment on their views.
The historical literature on the press clause demonstrates that the true
intent of the first amendment's authors cannot be derived from the text of
the amendment itself or from the debates surrounding its drafting and ratifi-
cation."' The existing historical evidence has led to several conclusions
112. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY
OF SUPPRESSION 126-27 (1963) ("The colonists gave little independent thought and even less ex-
pression to a theory of unfettered debate.").
113. J. LOFTON, supra note I10, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Two of our most prominent first amendment theorists, Chafee and Emerson, warn us
that the historical inquiry is futile because "the framers had no very clear idea as to what they
meant." See Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949) (reviewing A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 51). Since it is impossible at this late date to ascertain what they meant,
see Emerson, supra note 19, at 737. Our most prominent first amendment historian, Leonard
Levy, believes it is possible to ascertain what the framers meant, but tells us it does not matter as
we are not bound by their understanding. L. LEVY, supra note 112, at 4. Further, Lange briefly
examined the eighteenth century literature on press freedom and found that neither the fourth
estate metaphor nor the press as we know it had yet been conceived when the first amendment was
drafted. Lange, supra note 8, at 90.
Another scholar has noted that the precise motives of those who drafted the speech and press
clauses "are unlikely to be discovered now, if indeed they ever were ascertainable." Lewis, Pre-
ferred Position for Journalism, 7 HOESTRA L. REV. 595, 599 (1979); see also Z. CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-35 (1941); H. DRINKER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
AMERICA 2-6 (1957); B. HUDSON, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1963).
One scholar has reviewed in depth the legislative history behind the first amendment, i.e., the
proceedings of the ratifying conventions and the records of the ratifying state legislatures, and has
found this history inconclusive as to the intent underlying the press clause. Anderson, The Ori-
gins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 485-87, 497 (1983). In addition, the sparse
history of the drafting of the Bill of Rights provides little insight into the reasons for the specific
wording of the amendment. Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment as Ordi-
nary Language, 87 HARV. L. REV. 374, 392-93 (1973). The legislative history of the press clause
is itself scant and leads only to speculative and inconclusive judgments. Marshall, Examining the
Institutional Interpretation of the Press Clause, 58 TEX. L. REV. 171, 176 (1979); see also Nimmer,
supra note 8, at 648 ("History casts little light on the question here posed .... Nothing in the
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about the framers' intentions but cannot justify any concrete conclusions.'" 6
Indeed, there is broad agreement that the history of the first amendment
reveals little about the framers' intent. Several scholars, for example, be-
lieve that the framers intended only to eliminate prior restraint."'7
In Legacy of Suppression, Professor Levy states that the colonists paid
scant attention to developing or expressing a theory of a free press. He
notes that the debate on the Bill of Rights during ratification was conducted
without any precise definition of the meaning of freedom of the press.' 1 8
According to Levy, most of the framers were probably satisfied that existing
common law adequately protected speech and press freedoms.119 Further-
more, at the time of the drafting and ratification of the first amendment, few
if any of the drafters understood what was meant by the free press clause. 120
Given the multitude of studies conducted to determine the framers' in-
tent as to the meaning of a free press and the near unanimous conclusion
that such studies can only produce uncertain conclusions, the historical fo-
cus of this article will be to examine the nature and structure of the colonial
press leading up to and existing at the time of the adoption of the first
amendment. Such an examination may provide insight into the meaning
and purpose of the press clause. The assumption is that the framers would
have wanted to protect the type of press structure and industry existing at
the time of the adoption of the first amendment. For example, Levy states
that:
When the framers of the First Amendment provided that Congress
shall not abridge the freedom of the press they could only have
meant to protect the press with which they were familiar and as it
operated at the time. They constitutionally guaranteed the practice
fragmentary records of debate attending the adoption of the first amendment suggests that the
Founding Fathers had ... any other distinction [between the freedom of speech and freedom of
press clauses] in mind, when they chose to protect both freedom of speech and of the press against
abridgement."); Rooney, supra note 103, at 34 ("One certainty emerges from a review of the
history of both the speech and press clauses: the true intent of the first amendment's authors is
essentially unknown.").
116. L. LEVY, supra note 112, at 236.
117. See Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Resume, 30
YALE L.J. 48 (1920)
118. L. LEVY, supra note 112, at 215. Neither the great Bill of Rights advocates such as
Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee and George Mason, nor the newspapers,
pamphlets, or the ratifying convention debates provide insight.
119. Berlin, Book Review, 72 YALE L.J. 631, 633 (1963) (reviewing L. LEVY, supra note
112).
120. L. LEVY, supra note 112, at 236.
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of freedom of the press. They did not adopt its legal definition as
found in Blackstone or in the views of libertarian theorists.1 21
Levy also states that the free press clause recognized and strove to perpetu-
ate the existing conditions in the press industry.12 2 This type of historical
approach was hinted at when, in 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the
Press speculated as to what freedom of the press meant at the time of the
drafting and ratification. 123 At that time, no one had any great difficulty in
publishing their thoughts and opinions; governmental interference was seen
as the only constraint. Colonial Americans did not intend or assume that
any one newspaper would represent all or most of the conflicting viewpoints
regarding public issues. All newspapers together would do so, and if they
did not, individuals whose opinions were not represented could start a
newspaper of their own. 124
B. Printers in Colonial America: "Bulletin Boards"
for Their Communities
During the colonial period, printers ordinarily edited and published
newspapers by themselves. 12 5 However, these printer-editors or their jour-
neymen wrote only a few local stories. They compiled and edited some
news from other colonial towns and solicited contributing pieces from
outside authors and subscribers. The contributors were commonly profes-
sional men who supplied essays on social topics and public affairs.126
Newspapering in the colonial period was an unstable business. 127 The
threat of competitors and of a loss of subscribers prevailed. To supplement
their incomes, publishers often tried to diversify and broaden their printing
business activities.128 Another obstacle facing the early press consisted of
certain legal constraints. British attempts to impose various licensing re-
121. L. LEVY, supra note 66, at 272.
122. Id.
123. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 28.
124. Id.
125. F. MOr, AMERICAN JOURNALISM 46 (1950).
126. Id.
127. Even the successful newspapers had difficulty in getting paid by subscribers. James
Parker of the New York Gazette and Weekly Post Boy declared that "in the best of my times, at
least a quarter failed to pay." His colleague on the New York Weekly Journal complained that
some of his subscribers were in arrears for "upwards of seven years." According to the owners of
the Connecticut Journal, "they have not for this year past received from all the customers for this
journal so much money as they have expended for the blank paper on which it is printed."
McAnear, James Parker v. New York Province, in NEW YORK HISTORY, XXII 7 (1941) (citation
omitted).
128. A. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 53 (1958). Thus, the editor was pri-
marily an entrepreneur who had other affairs besides the publishing and printing of a newspaper.
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straints continued in the colonies until the 1720's. 129 In response to the
early colonial licensing system, a movement started in the general popula-
tion and later at the constitutional convention for limitations on federal
powers in the area of free speech and press.130 The expiration of colonial
licensing and the concomitant absence of prior restraints contributed to the
belief that expression was not reserved for the privileged few but was the
common right of all people.13 1  Many historians believe that the first
amendment resulted from the framers' familiarity with previous instances
of press restraint, i.e., licensing and censorship. 132
In 1790, a different type of economic restriction on the press developed.
The postmaster general proposed a plan to tax newspapers for using the
mail system. 133 Circulation depended on cheap mailing rates, and many
opposition papers viewed this "tax" as a Federalist attempt to restrict the
anti-administration newspapers. As with licensing, the colonial concern
about press restriction with the mail tax revolved around restrictions on
publishing and circulation rather than on restrictions involving content.
Colonial printers usually learned their trade as apprentices and later
purchased their own press equipment. 134 They were, by training, just
mechanics. Given the acute need to maintain circulation, they strove to
serve all the diverse interests in their communities. These efforts generally
paid off, and an increase of newspapers accompanied the larger
circulations. 135
The content of colonial newspapers closely mirrored the desires of read-
ers. Newspapers contained everything from news to advertisements to
He was also a job printer and the local postmaster as well as the public printer. F. MOTT, supra
note 125, at 59.
129. L. LEVY, supra note 112, at 126-75.
130. D. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 877 (1969).
131. See Bogen, Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 444 (1983).
For a discussion of the dying of the licensing process in the colonies, see C. DUNIWAY, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETrS 78-79, 102-03 (1906).
132. Marshall, supra note 115, at 173.
133. See D. STEWART, supra note 130, at 460-61.
134. F. MOTT, supra note 125, at 46.
135. As often in the English provinces but not in London, a printer in America might face no
competition but still have a few clients because local demand for his product was apt to be slight.
See G. CRANFIELD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROVINCIAL NEVSPAPER, 1700 TO 1760, 168-
89 (1962); L. ROTH, THE COLONIAL PRINTER 169-90 (2d ed. 1938). Those who sought a
printer's skills, news or goods were predominantly men of property. Thus, the paying customers
usually came from the upper levels of society. Only where a printer's competitive position was
exceptionally strong or local leaders were unusually divided could he afford to alienate a substan-
tial portion of them. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 54.
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literary and political essays. 13 6 In short, newspapers were essentially "bul-
letin boards for their communities."'' 37
In order to please their customers, colonial printers were impartial in
their printing. Printers justified this trade strategy in idealistic terms, defin-
ing a free press as one open to all parties. 138 Whatever the social utility of
impartiality may have been, printers were attracted to the principle because
it suited their business interests to please all customers. This principle was
also consistent with eighteenth century doctrines of the public interest, de-
fined in terms of free competition and grounded in economic pragmatism.
This was a very "mechanical" point of view. The practice of neutrality
continued for decades preceding the revolutionary crisis.'39 Strict political
neutrality, however, which had never been easy to maintain in a time of
conflict became nearly unachievable during a political crisis like the
revolution. i40
Political essays and contributions from subscribers constituted a large
proportion of the contents of a newspaper.' 4 ' According to Emery, the ma-
jority of editors envisioned their role as providing opportunities to express
views on social topics and public affairs.' 42 Community leaders, in turn,
also relied on the press to publish public debate in the form of letters to the
editor.'43 In this sense, the press did indeed serve as an organ through
which the literate members of the community could, and very often did,
voice their political and social opinions.' The pivotal role played by the
press in "gathering information and opinions" was held not by the printer
but by his contributors.145 The printer, of course, discharged all the other
press functions, such as printing, circulation and advertising.
136. For a discussion on the content of colonial newspapers, see Weir, supra note 61, at 117-
19.
137. D. STEWART, supra note 133, at 4.
138. See G. CRANFIELD, supra note 135, at 118. The literature on liberty of expression in the
colonies is vast but mainly tangential to the point here, since most of what has been written does
not take into account the perspectives of printers. A useful overview of some general issues raised
by the literature may be found in L. LEVY, supra note 112, at i-xx.
139. Botein, Printers & The American Revolution, in THE PRESS & THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 29-30 (B. Bailyn & Hench eds. 1980).
140. P. DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763 - 1783, 304-07
(1941); 2 I. THOMAS, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN AMERICA 333-34 (1972).
141. D. STEWART, supra note 133, at 20.
142. E. EMERY, supra note 111.
143. W. CHENERY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 144 (1955).
144. Weir, supra note 61, at 132.
145. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 60.
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C. The Competitive Nature of the Colonial Printing Industry
It is important to note the economic and competitive context of the
newspaper industry that faced the framers of the first amendment in 1791.
Their experience was with an industry comprised of many small enter-
prises. 146 Barriers to entry were fairly low. Thirty-nine newspapers were
published in the colonies at the time of the battles of Lexington and Con-
cord.'47 An extraordinary growth in the number of newspapers occurred
the following decade. Approximately sixty newspapers appeared in the mid-
1780's, many of which eventually ceased publication. The first daily news-
paper appeared in 1783. By 1790, eight dailies and eighty-three weeklies
existed. Competing printshops existed in all the larger settlements after
1730, and little if any collusion occurred between colonial printers. 4 ' In
all, 450 newspapers started up in the period from 1783 to 1801.'14
Competition between papers was stiff, and as the conflict with Great
Britain worsened, printers had to be especially sensitive to the political
wishes and opinions of their local readers. Printers knew who their readers
were and whether they harbored loyalist or patriotic tendencies. Commu-
nity pressure influenced printers and shaped their business and publishing
decisions. 150 Printers sometimes went out of business because they failed
to please the local populace.' 5' Loss of subscribers put many of the pro-
British newspapers out of business during the revolutionary period. 5 2 This
danger was especially present in large cities like Boston and Philadelphia
where many presses existed. 153 In short, papers were both subject and re-
sponsive to the wishes of society.
If, as Owen suggests, we accept the idea that each newspaper expressed
one point of view to the virtual exclusion of all others, the diversity of opin-
ion in the post-revolutionary press was directly related to the number of
146. B. OWEN, supra note 19, at 6.
147. Id. at 64.
148. Id. at 43. Owen cites this as evidence of his assertion that the press industry was charac-
terized by small-scale, competitive presses.
149. Id.
150. Botein, supra note 139, at 21.
151. Id. at 21, 33, 44-45.
152. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 223-26. Despite the informal tactics of the
patriots aimed at keeping opinions contrary to their own out of print, after 1760, the lower houses
in patriot control largely abandoned the practice of punishing printers for breach of privilege, and
ten state constitutions in the revolutionary period explicitly protected a free press. See Buel, Free-
dom of the Press in Revolutionary America: The Evolution of Libertarianism, 1760- 1820 in THE
PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 60 (Bailyn & Hench ed. 1981).
153. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 216.
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newspapers.' 54 The early constitutional period, characterized by many
publications reflecting highly partisan viewpoints, saw a true marketplace of
ideas in which there was relatively easy access to the channels of communi-
cation. 155 Newspaper publishing during the period preceding adoption of
the first amendment emanated from many competitive, small-scale and rela-
tively fragmented sources rather than from the integrated, large-scale and
highly organized media of today. 156 In the framers' experience, "economic
competition was consistent with the political function of the press because
of the small scale technology of printing and the rapid rate of entry in the
industry in the decade preceding 1791." 15  According to Owen, the first
amendment should be viewed as having at least one implicit assumption,
"that competition in the marketplace of ideas will be conducive to a polit-
ical freedom in a democratic system."' 55 The economic history of the colo-
nial publishing industry, according to Owen, shows that freedom of the
press is consistent with unregulated competition when the press is charac-
terized by small-scale technologies and ease of entry.' 59
D. The Opinion Function of the Colonial and Revolutionary Press
During the colonial and revolutionary periods, the press served as a ve-
hicle for voicing the interests of one group against those of another. 60
Each group vied for the support of public opinion through the press. In-
deed, almost every newspaper served as a channel for public debate' 61 and
became an open forum for the discussion of politics. 162 During the years
preceding the revolution, several newspapers existed strictly as journals of
opinion and did not even bother to print hard news.' 63 Throughout the
journalistic debate on the Tea Act, the content of the newspapers leaned
154. B. OWEN, supra note 19, at 44.
155. Ervin, supra note 24, at 879; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249
(1974).
156. Lively & Leahy, supra note 23, at 913. Late eighteenth century newspapers published
only a scattering of most insignificant advertisements because publishers considered their publica-
tions vehicles for influencing public thought. E. EMERY, supra note 111.
157. B. OWEN, supra note 19, at 44.
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id.
160. J. LOFTON, supra note 110, at 18. Owen finds that the newspaper publisher during the
revolutionary period still behaved as a conduit for news and opinions; however, the overwhelming
majority of newspapers at that time began to identify strongly with one political group or another.
See B. OWEN, supra note 19, at 44.
161. S. KOBRE, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 77 (1968).
162. See, e.g., J. TEBBEL, THE COMPACT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER 35
(1963).
163. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 143.
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more toward opinions, essays and propaganda than toward objective
news. 164 In fact, a close alliance developed between newspapers and polit-
ical groups, such as the Sons of Liberty.16 Furthermore, whenever polit-
ical groups felt it necessary, they founded new newspapers. 166
The press became intertwined with the partisanship of the revolutionary
era and newspapers often started up as certain political issues rose in impor-
tance.' 67 The outburst of public hostility against the Stamp Act passed by
Parliament in 1765 was so intense that it led to the startup of four new
newspapers.' 68 Indeed, the campaign against the Stamp Act greatly in-
creased the opinion role of newspapers.'69 Even more so than the Stamp
Act, the Townshend Acts also sparked an intense battle of opinion that was
waged in the newspapers.'7 ° The war of opinion and propaganda was
fought between the patriot press and the government press.17' Despite the
increased power of the press during the Revolution, however, Schlesinger
concludes that it had never been anything more than a mere transmitter of
public opinion.'
72
Historians have concluded that the influence of the revolutionary press
firmly established the opinion-making role of the press in America and con-
tributed to the democratization of American politics.' 73 Furthermore, to
colonial Americans, the press offered a solution to their most chronic prob-
lem - disunity. 74 Newspapers played a special role in welding together a
united populace by disseminating knowledge of political theory, institutions
164. For a discussion of the content of the newspapers, see id. at 99-182.
165. Id. at 72-73.
166. I. THOMAS, supra note 140, at 86-95.
167. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 119-23.
168. Id. at 80-82.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 95. Particular instances of prosecutions for seditious libel are discussed id. at 96-
98.
171. Id. at 132-34. The pro-government writers seemed to concentrate more on destroying
the critics rather than the criticisms. Id. at 138.
172. Id. at 60.
173. Weir, supra note 61, at 99-100; see also P. DAVIDSON, supra note 140, at 225-45; F.
MOTT, supra note 125, at 107-08; J. TEBBEL, THE MEDIA IN AMERICA 34-50 (1974). Indeed, one
author states that by the end of the war, public opinion had become the foundation of American
democratic development. See J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS 432 (1956).
174. Buel, supra note 152, at 72-73; see also Rabben, Book Review, The Ahistorical Historian:
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985)
(reviewing L. LEVY, supra note 66).
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and rulers. A sophisticated network of presses had been built up, and news
could be spread fairly quickly throughout the colonies.' 75
In the 1790's, development of the Republican and Federalist parties led
to the development of partisan presses subsidized by each party. 176 Europe-
ans commented on the multiplicity of journals in the United States and on
the ability of those journals to both shape public opinion and to act as ba-
rometers of public opinion.' 7 7 Newspapers were published with greater fre-
quency and in greater variety than any other form of publication. The press
was, for each party, the conduit between its leaders and the general public.
Prominent Republicans emphasized the importance of public opinion
early in the first Federalist administration of George Washington. The
Republicans valued a free press because of their belief that public opinion
was in the process of continuous formulation and could best be conveyed
through the press. 178 According to Republicans, the press served two im-
portant functions; first, as the prime channel for conveying advice to those
in power, and second, as a safety valve for pent-up emotions.179 James
Madison wrote that in order for public opinion to serve as "the real sover-
eign," the public required a free press and a circulation of newspapers
throughout the public.'8 ° This reasoning led Republicans to establish a
journal sympathetic to their cause in order to combat the predominantly
Federalist press.'
E. The Political Role of the Press in Revolutionary America
Leaders in revolutionary America attached great importance to the free-
dom of the press, at least as they understood it. 182 Patriots realized the
power of the press and valued freedom of the press because they knew that
the press was needed to keep them informed and to build support for the
revolution.' 8 3 In 1765, John Adams observed in his "Dissertation on the
Canon and Futile Law" that he knew of no "means of information.., more
175. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 282-83. For example, intercolonial news carried by
newspapers increased more than sixfold in the four decade span from 1730 to 1770. See R. MER-
RITT, SYMBOLS OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY, 1735 TO 1775, 56, 97, 131, 180 (1966).
176. See D. STEWART, supra note 133, at 10-11.
177. Id. at 13.
178. J. SMITH, supra note 173, at 421.
179. D. STEWART, supra note 133, at 445.
180. Rabban, supra note 174, at 795.
181. Id.
182. Botein, supra note 139, at 59.
183. Buel, supra note 152, at 59; see also D. STEWART, supra note 133, at 12.
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sacred... than the press." 184 Newspapers were an important tool for the
colonial leadership. If the American Revolution was an intellectual move-
ment in which politics replaced religion as the chief concern of the colonial
intellectual elite, newspapers became the equivalent of secular bibles.185
By the 1740's, the colonial press had become an indispensable part of
politics and the chief means of communicating public opinion to the gov-
ernment. For example, in 1754, seventeen pamphlets appeared in Boston to
protest and eventually defeat a liquor excise bill that was being proposed by
the Massachusetts legislature.186 Having greater impact and wider dissemi-
nation potential than any other type of communication at the time, the
press became the major organ for the distribution of political opinion dur-
ing the revolutionary period. Aside from the thousands of pamphlets pub-
lished during the revolutionary period, newspapers were the most effective
organ of propaganda during the revolution. 18 7
Before the disruption of war, the revolutionary period had been a time
of great expansion in the American newspaper industry.'88 Newspaper cir-
culation increased significantly, reflecting the heightened political tone of
colonial journalism. Essays and contributed articles played an important
role in the newspapers of the day, and coverage of American political news
increased. 89 The printer himself continued mainly as a conduit for other
sources of news and opinions, but it was impossible for him to remain neu-
tral in the struggle. By the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1775, al-
most every newspaper in the colonies could be clearly identified as either
patriot or Tory.190 Under the circumstances, many printers undoubtedly
concluded that partisan commitments might prove advantageous. 191 The
184. Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Futile Law in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
457 (C. Adams ed. 1851).
185. Morgan, The American Revolution Considered as an Intellectual Movement, in PATHS
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 11-33 (Schlesinger & White ed. 1970).
186. Eghal & Ernst, An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution, 29 WM. &
MARY Q. 1 (1972).
187. P. DAVIDSON, supra note 140, at 209, 225.
188. From 1763 to 1775, the number of newspapers doubled from 21 in 1763 to 42 in 1775.
See C. HEARTMAN, CHECKLIST OF PRINTERS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM STEVEN DAYE TO
THE CLOSE OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1915).
189. B. OWEN, supra note 19, at 42.
190. S. KOBRE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL NEWSPAPER 147-48 (1944).
191. Although it is unclear whether or to what extent purely political printing grew to be-
come a significant business of its own during the revolutionary years, it is obvious that the political
loyalties of printers could be crucial in determining who would be their customers or readers. See
Parker, The Philadelphia Printer: A Study of an Eighteenth Century Businessman, 40 Bus. HIST.
REV. 38 (1966). As contrasted with their Tory counterparts, many patriot printers reacted to the
revolution by making clear their political commitments. The patriot cause after all was generally
popular and hence likely to be profitable as well. See P. DAVIDSON, supra note 140, at 304; S.
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colonial newspapers, despite becoming partisan, still served as forums for
public debate. 19 2
The press became a major figure in the political life of the new republic.
Long after independence, newspapers exerted a significant influence on pub-
lic opinion, and partisan journalism became a well-established feature of
American politics.193 As Reverend Samuel Miller observed at the start of
the century, the newspapers of America were "immense, moral and polit-
ical engines" that advanced opinions as well as reported occurrences.' 94
F. The Historical Basis for Interpreting the Press Clause as a Structural
Provision of the Constitution
An historical analysis of the conditions and circumstances surrounding
the colonial and revolutionary press reveals some of the intent and meaning
of the free press clause, assuming that the framers would have wanted to
protect the type of press industry that had existed during the colonial and
revolutionary periods. Whether the framers would have acted differently if
they had been faced with a media structure such as exists today is, of
course, uncertain. However, the evidence shows that their experience was
with a highly partisan and competitive press, and one in which there was
great accessibility.' 95
The historical analysis presented above yields several conclusions.
First, a very competitive and open press existed during the colonial and
revolutionary eras. There was easy access to printing presses and new
presses could start up fairly easily. Both the presses and printers seemed
relatively mobile.' 96 Thus, there were low barriers of entry to the printing
industry, and the number of newspapers were constantly increasing. Fur-
thermore, presses were relatively small-scale and were very sensitive to the
communities' ideas and demands. As Professor Owen has noted, it was a
very competitive media market.197
Second, newspaper publishers and editors, especially in the late colonial
and revolutionary period, viewed their role as a political one. They also
KOBRE, supra note 190, at 147-48 (lists 39 newspapers as patriot and 18 as Tory); A. SCHLES-
INGER, supra note 128, at 137, 165.
192. See, e.g., Dickerson, British Control of American Newspapers on the Eve of the Revolu-
tion, 24 NEW ENG. Q. 455-59 (1951).
193. W. CHENEY, supra note 143, at 143-45; F. Morr, supra note 125, at 113-14.
194. On the development of partisan journalism after the Revolutionary War, see generally
D. STEWART, supra note 133.
195. See supra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
196. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 55-56.
197. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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recognized their role in uniting the colonies. Editors believed that their
papers served as forums for political debate. Contents of the newspapers
tended to focus primarily on political essays contributed by subscribers, and
not on "hard news" and investigative reporting. Political opinion consti-
tuted an important part of the early newspapers and formed the major por-
tion of the content of newspapers; the colonial newspapers were not
supposed to act primarily as investigative bodies digging up facts. As evi-
dence of the emphasis on opinion-publishing, a distinct tendency existed to
print propaganda pieces over objective reporting.'98 In this same vein,
newspapers served a central role in providing a channel of communication
among society and between the colonies.
Third, the physical makeup of the colonial press supports the idea of the
press clause as a "marketplace protector." A printer set up a press which
served in a sense as a bulletin board for the community. Printers were
viewed as "mechanics" and only much later as "partisans." The printer did
not have a staff which would investigate and write stories. Rather, the
printer was dependent upon the community for providing news or opinions.
In effect, the duty of the printer was to provide the physical means for
society to communicate. The historical evidence shows that one newspaper
could not present all the viewpoints of the community, rather, several news-
papers were needed to do that.
Fourth, the reactions to the restrictions placed upon colonial and revo-
lutionary newspapers casts doubt on the validity of the fourth estate model
of the press. The historical evidence shows that newspapers opposed both
the British Stamp Act and the proposed postal restrictions in 1792. These
measures in effect placed a tax upon the circulation and dissemination of
newspapers. Furthermore, printers had also protested the licensing system
imposed by the British. Colonists argued that the licensing system perpetu-
ated monopolies in the printing press industry. Protests over these restric-
tions show that printers wanted a free and competitive printing press.
The free circulation of newspapers appears to have been more important
to the printers than freedom from prosecution for seditious libel. Levy's
thesis on the existence of the law of seditious libel does not affect the revised
marketplace model of the free press clause proposed here. Under this
model, the free press clause was designed to protect the structure of the
newspaper industry rather than the content of published speech. Indeed,
this model is consistent with the status of the common law of seditious libel.
The revised marketplace model can be harmonized with the desire by the
framers to retain the common law of seditious libel because: (1) the model
198. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 128, at 261.
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does not focus on the content of speech; and (2) the revised marketplace
model does not perceive the press as a watchdog on government. In effect,
seditious libel seemed to be more of a political question than a constitu-
tional question. Some editors favored prosecutions for seditious libel at
some times and not at other times. However, they all protested restrictions
such as the Stamp Act, the licensing system and the postal rate increases.
Finally, the framers seemed more concerned about getting ideas into
public circulation than about the particular content and quality of those
ideas. Colonial and revolutionary newspapers sometimes tended to print
rumor and emotional propaganda, but as long as there were enough news-
papers to allow ideas, especially contrary ideas to circulate among the pub-
lic, rumor and such propaganda did not seem to pose a problem for the
framers. Thus, they seemed more concerned with having outlets for pub-
lishing their own ideas rather than ensuring that whatever ideas were
printed were of a particular quality or content.
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE PRESS CLAUSE UNDER THE "REVISED
MARKETPLACE" MODEL
A. Introduction
The revised marketplace model best serves the values of a free press
through a two-part effect. First, it affords protection to each individual me-
dia outlet for the performance of that media's press and speech functions.
This can be analogized to a negative liberty. The second aspect of the
model addresses the structure of the press industry. Unlike the "fourth
estate" model, however, it does not create an independent activist entity to
perform certain "governmental" or "checking" functions. Instead, the "re-
vised marketplace" model focuses on the industry structure and attempts to
achieve two goals: media responsiveness to the community's opinions and
wide public participation in the political process. The difference between
the fourth estate model and the revised marketplace model is that the for-
mer creates a privileged industry while the latter protects a competitive one.
According to the "revised marketplace" model, the press does not represent
the public, or act as an agent of society in its dealings with government.
Rather, the press acts as a channel for communications to pass through
society and from society to government. This model highly emphasizes citi-
zen participation, natural communication among society, and the dissemi-
nation of opinions as opposed to investigative facts.
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B. Functions of an Individual Newspaper Protected as Negative Liberties
Analyzing cases under the free press clause initially requires identifica-
tion of the basic individual functions of the press. Traditionally, the right of
freedom of the press has been applied to each of four identified functions
that the media performs: newsgathering, writing and editing, publication,
and distribution.1 99 Although protection of each component rests upon the
same constitutional phrase - the free press clause - the Supreme Court
has imposed varying constitutional protections for each function. 2°0 How-
ever, this traditional approach to the media functions protected by the free
press clause looks only to the functions of an individual newspaper, not to
the overall structural or industry-wide aspects of the press. The "revised
marketplace" model takes this broader view. Under the "revised market-
place" theory, the free press clause protects an institutional framework of
independent, competing newspapers that provide opportunities for partici-
pation, community responsiveness and an accessible forum for speakers.
The scope of the "revised marketplace" model can be analyzed from a two-
tiered organization of the functions and features of a free press: first, an
outline of those functions which are essential for an individual newspaper to
perform; and second, a discussion of those functions and features of the
institutional structure or system of a free press composed of independent
and competing newspapers.
The writing and editing component currently receives virtually absolute
protection from government restrictions. 20 ' Government may never dictate
what information must or cannot be included in a story or how that infor-
mation must be arranged.2 "2 The publication component also receives a
199. See Borger, Newsgathering versus Privacy: Tension Around the First Amendment, I
HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).
200. Some justices find no substantive difference between the speech and press clauses of the
first amendment. Former Chief Justice Burger seemed to take this position, and he was supported
by Justices White, Blackman, and Rehnquist. Others believe that the press is entitled to broad
constitutional protection because the press clause protects the press as an institution. Justice
Stewart is the major proponent of this position. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). Others hold that the press clause was designed to preserve the societal function of the
press: the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. This appears to be the position
of Justices Stevens, Marshall, Brennan and former Justice Powell. See Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (plurality opinion); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
201. C.B.S., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973); see also Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("It has yet to be demonstrated how govern-
mental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guar-
antees .... ").
202. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.
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high level of protection, but additional restrictions on press activity appear
at this point. For instance, publishers may be liable for civil damages for
invasion of privacy21 3 or for libel. 2" The level of constitutional protection
diminishes significantly for the distribution component. Although govern-
ment may not prohibit distribution of information, 20 5 reasonable regula-
tions of the time, place and manner of distribution are permissible.
Newsgathering has only recently received independent constitutional
protection. 20 6  Not until 1972 did the issue of a constitutional right to
gather news come before the United States Supreme Court in Branzberg v.
Hayes.2 °7 Although the Court recognized that newsgathering was entitled
to some constitutional protection, the plurality opinion narrowly restricted
that protection. At the present time, however, the Court has not yet devel-
oped a consistent stance toward a right of newsgathering. The Court has
recognized a first amendment right to gather news, but has refused to en-
force it in certain situations.20 8 It was not until Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, that the Court expressly applied the right to gather informa-
tion.2 9 Richmond was followed by Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior
Court,21 ° which applied Richmond in a majority opinion invalidating a
203. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
204. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
205. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938).
206. For a discussion of the history underlying the right of newsgathering, see Borger, supra
note 199, at 6-13.
207. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The three cases consolidated for review in Branzburg involved
reporters who had covered activities of Black Panthers or of local drug users. Each reporter was
subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify concerning information he had obtained in confidence in the
course of his newsgathering activities. Justice White's opinion (Justice White was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and by Justice Blackman) conceded that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. Nonetheless, Justice White
required the reporters to answer the grand jury's questions. Id. at 702. Justice White equated the
press' right to gather news with the public's right to obtain information; reporters, like other
citizens, would have to cooperate with the grand jury. Id. Reporters could seek protection from
the court only if the grand jury investigation was "undertaken not for the purpose of law enforce-
ment but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources." Id. at 707-08.
208. In the companion cases of Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the Court rejected attacks by news media representatives against
what they perceived as an interference with their right to gather news and upheld state and federal
prison regulations which banned all personal interviews between news reporters and individually
designated prison inmates. In both cases, the majority of the Court treated the central issue as one
of affirmative access to public information.
209. 448 U.S. 555. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that the first amendment guar-
antees the right of public and press to attend criminal trials. Id. at 575-78.
210. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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Massachusetts statute that excluded the press and general public during the
testimony of a minor victim in a sex offense trial.211
Newsgathering, like the editorial function and other functions of an in-
dividual newspaper, should be protected as a negative liberty, and not in an
affirmative manner or positive liberty as espoused by the "fourth estate"
model. In other words, the press clause prohibits the government from ac-
tively infringing upon a newspaper's ability to gather news, but it does not
grant to the press affirmative rights to gather news in ways unavailable to
the public. Essentially, editorial autonomy would be a protected function
under the free speech clause as a negative liberty. However, an independent
editorial decision-making process is also necessary for a free press. Other-
wise, a press organization would not fit the model of an independant, com-
peting newspaper in a diverse and competitive industry structure. Likewise,
protection of the dissemination and publication function is vital for the pro-
vision of a marketplace of competitive and independent sources of informa-
tion. The Supreme Court has emphasized that "liberty of circulating is as
essential to [freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing. Indeed, without
the circulation, the publication would be of little value. '21 2
Most who espouse protection for the affirmative aspects of newsgather-
ing also view the press according to the "fourth estate" model.213 This the-
ory stresses investigative reporting over opinion dissemination, and holds
that the press should act as a governmental watchdog entity. It is obvious
to see that if one follows the "fourth estate" model, then one must also
believe that protection of the newsgathering function is vital to a free press.
This, however, is a crucial distinction between the "fourth estate" model
and the "revised marketplace" model. Under the latter theory, the press
does not act as a quasi-organ of government but as a forum which permits
and facilitates communication among society. Thus, an affirmative right of
the press to information-gathering is not vital to a free press.
211. The Court held that the first amendment includes "those rights that, while not unam-
biguously enumerated .... are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
ights .... Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common
understanding that a major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs." Id. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
212. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727, 733 (1877)).
213. See Shattuck & Byers, An Egalitarian Interpretation of the First Amendment, 16 HARV.
C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 377 (1981). According to the authors, the press must perform the role of
keeping constant surveillance over the government's activities. To do this, the press must have a
right to seek and publish government information which is not accessible to the public. Therefore,
the press must have the freedom to pursue information and to engage in investigative journalism.
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Fourth estate theorists also claim that affirmative rights of newsgather-
ing are necessary for effective reporting. Effective reporting, however, is an
amorphous term. It is very difficult to provide for effective reporting
through constitutional law. Rather, effective reporting depends on the
many skills that a reporter possesses. The quality and scope of journalistic
information available to the public depends on the subjective talents of a
reporter rather than on the status of constitutional law or rights. Further-
more, those who argue for such affirmative protection of newsgathering em-
phasize investigative reporting over opinion dissemination. Opinion
dissemination, however, in many ways is more vital as it allows for a greater
political participation by the public. The press is not a branch of govern-
ment nor some outside, aloof institution designed to pass information to
society. It is a social forum which allows society to communicate ideas
which leads then to the formation and functioning of self-government.
There is no evidence that the press, even before the Court's decisions on
newsgathering, has ever had any difficulty conducting and reporting its in-
vestigations. Contrary to the pronouncements of the "fourth estate" model,
it is not the investigatory ability of the press that is threatened today;
rather, what is at jeopardy today is the "opinion" publishing and commu-
nity "bulletin boards" function of the press.
Proponents of a fourth estate role for the press often claim that the
Court should take a functional approach to constitutional claims under the
press clause, i.e., whatever functions are essential for a free press should be
protected. The fourth estatists also claim that newsgathering is an essential
function. Contrary to that model, however, the "revised marketplace"
model finds that two basic protections are vital for free press: first, there
must be a negative liberty protection for the activities of an individual news-
paper; and second, a structure of the press industry must exist which is
open and competitive, and allows for access and participation by citizens.
For example, regarding the first protection, the government cannot intrude
upon editorial autonomy or the newsgathering activities of a newspaper.
However, the government is not obliged to promote or give special consid-
erations to those activities. This theory coincides with the lack of special
privilege doctrine established by the Court.2 14 The second protection is dis-
cussed below.
214. This neutrality doctrine was used in the Pell and Saxbe cases and holds that the press
should be given no special rights beyond those enjoyed by the general public. See Saxbe, 417 U.S.
843; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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C. The Industry Structure of the Press Necessary to Uphold the Values of
a Free Press - A Criticism of the Fourth Estate Model
For the press to serve its function of providing a physical forum for
communication, social interaction and political participation, there must be
an industry composed of independent and competitive newspapers. Each
newspaper provides a single forum, and only several forums combined can
make up a sufficient social forum or marketplace for communication.215
Multiple forums for expression serve several functions. First, they provide
a source of diverse opinions and ideas which inform the public and allow
the public to govern itself. Second, they provide a natural means of access
to the majority-forming political process of a democracy. Circulation of
opinions does not then hinge upon a single editor's decision.216 Further-
more, such a competitive forum also indicates to the government the degree
of acceptance of those ideas. Finally, multiple forums promote citizen in-
volvement and participation in government.
Several commentators have read into the first amendment a guide or
indication as to the organization or structure of the overall media industry.
For instance, Professor Pool sees in the first amendment the view that a
freely competitive press is the best possible press and that structural reforms
may be necessary to achieve such a press.217 According to Professor Pool,
the first amendment creates a presumption that entry by news media cannot
be blocked.218 Professor Chafee also believed that the first amendment ad-
dresses the quality and effectiveness of our system of public discussion.21 9
215. One aspect of the media's role is its importance in the marketplace of ideas. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); New York Times, 376 U.S. 254; Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The media provides forums in this marketplace through
which individuals and groups may express their opinions. Direct involvement of citizens in gov-
ernment is implicit in the marketplace theory. Although control of the government by the repre-
sentative process is indirect, a free press helps bring about the political and social changes desired
by the citizens. See Ervin, supra note 24, at 884-85. While the marketplace theory carries the
image of a single forum for ideas, in reality the marketplace is many forums. A distinction must
be made between a guarantee of the opportunity to be heard in a forum and a guarantee that there
will be a multitude of forums for expression. The former is the primary objective of the first
amendment theory of Jerome Barron. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fair-
ness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 24-31 (1961) (the fairness doctrine and
the first amendment).
216. The right of access proposed by Jerome Barron does not serve this function of natural
selection of ideas. With a right of access, editors are forced to print certain opinions, without
being able to gauge the degree of acceptance of those opinions and who holds those opinions. In a
sense, a right of access creates a superficial outlet for ideas. Furthermore, a right of access im-
pinges upon the editorial integrity of a newspaper, while a natural forum does not.
217. I. POOL, supra note 13.
218. Id. at 9-10, 234-40.
219. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 115, at 559.
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Finally, Professor Emerson asserts that government must affirmatively
make available the opportunity for expression as well as protect it from
abridgment. 22' Therefore, the idea of the first amendment carrying a struc-
tural dimension is not novel. The need for such a dimension has long been
seen. The confusion, however, has been in articulating a theory of this
structural dimension and in reconciling it with both the speech and press
clauses. The "revised marketplace" model addresses this need.
In the early constitutional period, diverse viewpoints found outlets
through the many penny sheets. 221 Today, with the concentration among
newspaper chains, the number of viewpoints printed is limited and the
scope may not be representative of the whole society.222 Newspapers are
big businesses, and entry into the business is very difficult. The absence of
structural diversity might well be the result of such high entry barriers.
Nonetheless, while the "revised marketplace" model takes a structural view
of the first amendment as protecting a marketplace of competitive newspa-
pers, the specific application of that model is not outlined here.223
220. T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 629.
One author has stated that the first amendment should be interpreted "teleologically." See
Barron, supra note 14, at 430. Such an interpretation would look to the spirit of the press clause
and would then seek to uphold that spirit. For instance, if the first amendment is meant to give the
public a diverse source of ideas, then the first amendment would not protect activity of speakers
that decreases or limits the diversity of viewpoints expressed or the flow of ideas to the public. In
a sense then, rights are not given to individuals but to the act of communication and to the com-
municative process. Likewise, my theory might also fit into such an interpretation.
221. Barrow, supra note 13, at 686.
222. Id. Today, the capital required to publish a newspaper is immense. See B. RUCKER,
THE FIRsT FREEDOM 43-59 (1968).
Schmidt wrote that:
When the constitution was adopted.., the individual could make his opinions known by
... getting a printer to put a broadside .... With relative ease he could have an impact
. ... A newspaper might have been started with relatively little capital by one whose
views were strong enough to demand that they be aired .... The media today comprise
institutions far different from the press of two centuries ago .... The ability of any single
man to gain access to the marketplace of ideas has become all but extinct ....
B. SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 38-39 (quoting Baker & Ball, A Report to the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 9 MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE 68 (1969)).
223. For instance, in my theory of the free press clause, the Court may be required to give tax
benefits to an entering newspaper by extending the holding in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). In a previous case, the Court had outlined the
touchstones of constitutionally acceptable government regulation of the press. First, the impartial
distribution of information must not be affected. Second, the law must not constitute a special
burden on the press. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967) (plurality opinion).
Indeed, the Minneapolis Star case was decided on an analysis of the government's role toward the
press and on the structure of the press in society. The case did not rely merely on the prior
restraint doctrine. The Court validated its attacks not only because the tax discriminated between
newspapers but also because it differentiated between newspapers and other entities. Thus, the
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The importance of the press lies not specifically in the content of ideas
expressed but in providing a proper channel for the exchange of ideas. The
press should be viewed as first providing a "communication link" for soci-
ety, and then a "communication channel" between society and government.
Such a communication marketplace provides a means by which the various
political opinions are expressed in relation to the degree of their acceptance
in society. This leads to a more rational and complete process of political
action and decision-making. The communication role played by the press is
potentially a two-way street. Not only may citizens learn about govern-
ment actions, but the government by monitoring the contents of the media
will be able to gauge public opinion.224 A single newspaper may be able to
print most of the "hard news" available, but it cannot adequately respond
to the different opinions of all the different groups in a circulation area.
Indeed, there is a recognition that newspapers are not as opinionated today
as they were in the past.225
A structurally diverse press industry will naturally check and bring to
light abuses of governmental power. Indeed, a strong, competent and in-
dependent press should be able to work within any information environ-
ment. However, structural diversity according to the revised marketplace
226model will not lead to large, powerful and dominating presses. Such in-
stitutions may provide a check on government, but they will not be an eas-
ily accessible source for opinions of individuals. Structural diversity is the
best way to promote a marketplace for opinion dissemination. Opinion dis-
semination constituted the primary purpose and function of the press in the
eighteenth century. Only lately has investigation taken priority over opin-
ion dissemination in the minds of some legal scholars and journalists.227
Court seems to recognize that the industrial framework of the press deserves special attention in
that a structural diversity made up of independent competitive media outlets is necessary. See
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585-86. In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
the Court held that the first amendment barred a tax imposed so as to potentially discourage the
widespread circulation of a newspaper. This holding again illustrates the value and function of a
free press - a structurally diverse industry made up of independent and competitive newspapers.
224. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1950). Judge Learned Hand
stated that the airing of dissident views "may convince the officials themselves [to change], and in
any event it may rouse up a body of contrary opinion to which they will yield, or which will
displace them." Id.
225. I. POOL, supra note 13, at 238.
226. As I have previously pointed out, such concentration also reduces the participation of
the public in the political process. Thus, concentration reduces the representative nature of our
democracy.
227. The trend has been significantly pronounced in the post-Watergate era. See Murphy,
Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical Developments, 66 MINN. L. REV. 95, 133-37
(1981).
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The publication of opinions can always lead to investigation. However, in-
vestigation reporting will not necessarily lead to a diverse source of
opinions.
The "fourth estate" theory of the press views the press as an agent of the
public in a separation of powers scheme that functions to check abuses of
governmental power. Such a function, however, is not the primary role of
the press. Different branches of government exist to check each other, and
different political groups exist to check government. The "fourth estate"
model does not recognize the powerful role that the press serves in forming
political majorities and in providing social cohesion. The model does not
take a process-view of the press clause and does not see the press as provid-
ing open and accessible channels of communication between society and
government.
A problem exists with viewing the press as an agent of the public. After
all, the state is the official representative of the public and is organized
through the process of political participation. The press is at best an unoffi-
cial representative of an unorganized, fluctuating conglomeration of indi-
viduals bound together only by a shared need for information. Indeed, the
press is subject to no political constraints and has never been elected nor
chosen by the public to act as its agent.
According to the "fourth estate" model, the press must have power to
serve as an independent check on the government and therefore must be
guaranteed effective means to gather and disseminate the news. However,
under this theory, the press is publishing what it gathers itself rather than
publishing the ideas that come to it through an interacting society. Also,
the fourth estate model does not give special protection to an institution, it
gives added powers to particular newspapers - those newspapers that exist
in a monopolistic industry.
The "fourth estate" model of the free press clause has drawn criticism.
Professor Barron states that it is a mistake to identify the "press" with the
"people" and to think that protection of newsgathering rights for newspa-
pers is equivalent to enhancing the right of free expression for all members
of the community.2 2 8 The "fourth estate" model significantly enhances the
power of one of the participants in the communication process with abso-
lutely no corresponding imposition of responsibilities to assure that the new
protection will actually enlarge and protect opportunities for expression.22 9
228. Barron, supra note 14, at 1658. Professor Barron criticizes Justice Black's statement
that newspapers should be entirely immune from libel actions where public officials are being
attacked. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 297 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
229. Barron, supra note 14.
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Justice White has also criticized a fourth estate role of the press. 230 White
views the real threat not as that of press inhibition, but that of its distortion.
He sees the communications industry as already too powerful and detects
danger in the creation of an imbalance in the communications process.
23
'
The "revised marketplace" model addresses these criticisms.
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a great debate in both the courts and among legal schol-
ars about the meaning and nature of the press clause. As with all constitu-
tional questions, one of the first focuses of analysis is on the historical
evidence in an attempt to determine the intent of the framers. An historical
analysis into the actual working conditions of the colonial and revolution-
ary press shows that it was an open and competitive industry and played an
important political role. In short, the press acted as a forum for political
debate. To the colonists, newspapers were crucial in conveying political
ideas to the rest of society. At that time, it was important to have society
united in the political struggle against Britain. The press did not act as an
independent entity; it served as a channel of communication for colonial
society.
At first glance, the press clause seems to protect a physical entity - the
press. The language, along with the historical conditions of the press, seem
to indicate that the framers of the first amendment sought to protect the
press as a competitive industry within society. The "revised marketplace"
model argues that the press clause must be viewed as protecting a different
freedom than the speech clause. The speech clause protects individual
rights. The press clause serves mainly to ensure the protection of a particu-
lar type of press industry: the type of industry that existed at the time of
the framing of the first amendment - an open, competitive and easily ac-
cessible press.
The "revised marketplace" model is supported not only by the historical
evidence but also by the values of a free press in a democratic society.
These values are citizen participation, political opinion and open channels
230. Justice White's opinions include the following propositions: (1) there exists no privilege
regarding the editorial process of responsible parties when the published material is alleged to be
false and damaging, Herbert v. Landow, 441 U.S. 665 (1979); (2) newsroom files are not privileged
in criminal subpoena situations, see Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547; and (3) reporters are not privileged in
matters of offering testimony about criminal activity; see Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. Furthermore,
Justice White's dissent in Gertz, states that "[t]he First Amendment was intended to guarantee
free expression, not to create a privileged industry." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 399 (White, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
231. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 390-91, 400 (White, J., dissenting).
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of communication - and are more important in our constitutional scheme
than the legal power of the press to investigate. The "revised marketplace"
model set forth in this article seeks to address the criticism regarding press
concentration and, in so doing, opposes the "fourth estate" model as pro-
posed by Justice Stewart. It is argued that the "fourth estate" model is
based perhaps more upon reactions to recent history - Watergate and
Vietnam - than upon the overall analysis of the historical workings of the
press and upon the values we expect of a free press in a democratic society.
